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portfolios weakened by questionable
loans. The situation becomes even more
intractable if, as is the case in Japan,
prices are falling and the balance sheets
of many potential borrowers are in poor
condition. With falling prices, cash in a
bank’s vault will increase in value and
offer a return that may be greater than a
loan to a struggling business. In this type
of environment, how might a central
bank operate? 
■ Inflation, Credibility, and 
the Expectations Channel 
When Princeton University economist
Paul Krugman first suggested that Japan
was caught in a liquidity trap, he empha-
sized the importance of policy credibility
to making an escape. A central bank
caught in a liquidity trap faces the daunt-
ing task of convincing the public that it is
committed to raising the rate of inflation
substantially. The expectation that prices
will soon rise should have two effects on
economic activity. First, a public that
expects prices to be higher in the future
will spend today on both consumption
and investment in order to beat the com-
ing price increases. Second, as prices rise
and inflation expectations firm, loan
demand will strengthen, and interest
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When short-term interest rates hover
near zero, central banks may have 
difficulty offsetting downward
momentum on prices and economic
activity through traditional monetary-
policy channels, since commercial
banks have little incentive to make
loans.  Economists refer to this situa-
tion as a liquidity trap.  Do exchange
rate targets and foreign exchange
operations, as some have suggested,
offer a way to escape such a trap?
T he federal funds rate—the interest
rate that the Federal Reserve uses to
guide monetary policy—currently
stands at 1 percent, its lowest level since
the recession of 1958. Overnight reserve-
market interest rates are similarly low in
the euro area and are essentially at zero in
Japan. Rates this low raise concerns
among economists and policymakers
about the ability of central banks to 
conduct monetary policy. The problem is
that when prices are falling and short-
term interest rates approach zero, banks
may become indifferent between lending
and holding money in their portfolios. If
banks have no incentive to lend, the stan-
dard method for conducting monetary
policy—cutting short-term interest rates
by purchasing government securities to
add reserves to commercial bank portfo-
lios—becomes ineffective because
reserves stay in banks and are not lent out
to trickle through the economy. With this
mechanism closed, central banks may
find offsetting any downward momentum
in prices and economic activity inordi-
nately difficult. 
Economists often refer to this situation
as a liquidity trap, and they have pro-
posed a wide variety of ways to make 
an escape. Some economists, notably
Ben McCallum of Carnegie Mellon 
University and Lars Svensson of Prince-
ton University, suggest that central banks
buy foreign exchange instead of domestic
government securities and use an
exchange rate target to help guide mone-
tary policy out of a liquidity trap. 
While not everyone agrees that liquidity
traps are a serious possibility, in this
Economic Commentary, we assume they
are and discuss the merits and the draw-
backs of these exchange-rate-based
escapes. We show that while these 
foreign-exchange-based recommenda-
tions are theoretically feasible, they rely
on rather esoteric and largely untried
transmission mechanisms. Moreover,
they raise potential beggar-thy-neighbor
issues that would likely require the
domestic monetary authorities to coordi-
nate with foreign monetary authorities. 
■ The Japanese Experience
Japan’s economic experience over the
past 12 years, and the fear that similar
problems could develop in the United
States or in Europe, have motivated
much of the current discussion about 
liquidity traps. While the issue of
whether Japan is truly stuck in a liquid-
ity trap or is instead the victim of persis-
tent structural banking problems remains
contentious, the country exhibits most of
the hallmarks that economists associate
with a liquidity trap. Real growth in
Japan began to stagnate in 1990 (see 
figure 1). By 1995, prices started to fall,
and short-term interest rates reached
their zero limit. Frustrated by the inabil-
ity of standard monetary procedures to
combat these symptoms, the Bank of
Japan switched its operating procedure
in March 2001 from targeting a nominal
overnight interest rate to targeting
reserves held by Japanese banks. The
Bank has since increased its reserve 
target roughly fourfold and tripled the
amount of long-term Japanese govern-
ment bonds that it purchases each
month. These policy changes resulted in
a rapid increase in the monetary base,
but the broader money stock has not
grown apace (see figure 2). Commercial
banks in Japan apparently are still hold-
ing the additional reserves instead of
using them to support more lending. 
From the perspective of the banks, hold-
ing reserves makes economic sense. With
nominal short-term interest rates stuck at
zero, reserves and short-term interest-
bearing assets become close substitutes in
Japanese banks’portfolios—especiallyrates will also begin to rise. Banks will
no longer be content to hold excess
reserves, since idle cash in vaults will
lose value as prices rise. Lenders will
look to satisfy a rising loan demand and
earn a positive rate of return. Economic
activity will expand. 
Krugman advocated that the Bank of
Japan simply announce an inflation tar-
get and expand its open market opera-
tions accordingly. But a simple
announcement may not be sufficiently
convincing for central banks like the
Bank of Japan or the Federal Reserve
System, which have consistently
demonstrated an aversion to inflation. If
people doubt the central bank’s resolve
to generate inflation, economic activity
will continue to stagnate. 
Lars Svensson’s plan for escaping a liq-
uidity trap primarily offers a mechanism
for enhancing credibility. Not all econo-
mists agree in their interpretation of the
nuts and bolts of Svensson’s proposal, but
in the main, he seems to exploit a mecha-
nism known as the expectations channel. 
Svensson suggests that the Bank of
Japan—and, by extension, any central
bank caught in a liquidity trap—
announce a long-term target path for the
price level (necessarily embodying a
significant inflation rate) and a long-
term target path for the exchange rate
(necessarily embodying a significant
depreciation) that is consistent with the
target path for the price level. Svensson
argues that this twin announcement will
be more credible, since the Bank of
Japan can guarantee the exchange rate
depreciation by flooding the world with
yen by purchasing essentially unlimited
amounts of foreign exchange, such as
dollars or euros. Except for the instru-
ments involved—foreign currencies
instead of domestic securities—such an
operation is equivalent to a standard
central bank open market operation.
How then does this mechanism enhance
credibility? What encourages Japanese
banks to lend out these yen reserves
instead of holding on to them? 
The essential element in Svensson’s
proposal is that the Bank of Japan must
persuade the public that the yen will
remain at the depreciated rate until the
price target is achieved and convinc-
ingly maintained. Since exchange rates
are quoted minute by minute—unlike
price indexes, which appear at a
monthly frequency and only after a 
significant lag—the Bank of Japan’s
efforts to depreciate the yen are immedi-
ately and always visible. Market partici-
pants can continuously monitor the cen-
tral bank’s commitment to depreciate the
currency. The transparency of this mech-
anism enhances the central bank’s credi-
bility more than standard open market
operations aimed solely at an inflation
rate. The hope is that once the central
bank announces the twin target paths and
depreciates the yen, people will antici-
pate the inflation rate embodied in the
price-level target and will immediately
alter their behavior. 
While Svensson’s plan has the benefit of
being more transparent with respect to the
inflation objective than a typical open
market operation, it is far from foolproof.
Ultimately, it relies on the public seeing
the immediate depreciation of the yen and
therefore completely believing the central
bank’s commitment to the price-level 
target and higher inflation. However, the
plan could go awry if the public instead
believes that the immediate depreciation
of the yen is only temporary and perhaps
likely to be reversed. Given that the yen
has basically appreciated against the dol-
lar over the past 30 years, this possibility
cannot be ignored, as emphasized by
Stanford economist Ronald McKinnon.
■ Portfolio-Balance Channel
Ben McCallum’s proposal for a foreign-
exchange-based escape from a liquidity
trap introduces a channel of influence—
the portfolio-balance mechanism—that
does not depend on affecting expecta-
tions. In a liquidity trap, the purchase of
foreign exchange can produce a depreci-
ation—even if expectations about a
future depreciation and inflation do not
change—by altering the currency com-
position of assets in investors’portfolios.
If, for example, the Bank of Japan
acquires dollars (or other foreign curren-
cies), private investors across the globe
necessarily end up holding more yen-
denominated base money and securities
in their portfolios relative to dollar-
denominated assets. Although short-term
Japanese securities and currency may 
be perfect substitutes in a liquidity trap,
yen- and dollar-denominated assets
probably will not be perfect substitutes.
Consequently, international investors
may only acquire additional yen assets if
compensated for the risk of loading their
portfolios with them. Their initial aver-
sion to additional yen assets induces a
spot depreciation. With the expected
future exchange rate unchanged, the 
initial depreciation implies that the yen
will appreciate in the future and will
provide holders of the yen assets with a
valuation gain. This implied valuation
gain compensates investors for their
added risk. 
This portfolio-balance effect offers a
mechanism through which the spot
exchange rate will immediately depreci-
ate even if domestic short-term interest
rates are stuck at zero. As we discuss in
the next section, the yen depreciation
will lower the foreign currency prices of
Japanese goods and raise the yen price
of foreign goods. This change in relative
prices shifts worldwide demand—at
least temporarily—toward Japanese
goods and services. If the depreciation is
large enough, it could provide a suffi-
cient boost to lift economic activity out
of the liquidity trap. 
Although theoretically sound, the 
portfolio-balance mechanism lacks 
convincing empirical support. At best,
empirical studies suggest that to exploit
the portfolio-balance channel, a central
bank would have to undertake an
extremely large amount of foreign
exchange purchases—an amount well
beyond the typical central bank foreign
exchange intervention. However, for a
central bank caught in a liquidity trap,
these large purchases may indeed be
technically feasible. A central bank can
essentially print an unlimited amount of
its own currency, and the pool of foreign
currencies available for purchase is vast. 
■ Beggar-Thy-Neighbor
Along with questions about their feasibil-
ity, proposals to escape a liquidity trap
through planned currency depreciation
have raised concerns about their potential
consequences for other countries. The
depreciating country would gain competi-
tiveness—at least initially—at the expense
of its trading partners. Economist Michael
Mussa, for example, contends that such
proposals, if narrowly construed, might
violate the prohibition in the International
Monetary Fund’s Articles of Agreement
against “manipulating exchange rates…to
gain an unfair competitive advantage over
other members.” Even though the ultimate
objective is to generate inflation, and even
though any competitive gain would dissi-
pate as prices rose, the technical legality
of these proposals might be problematic. 
Clearly the fault lies solely in the
explicit yen depreciation, since any
monetary expansion that successfullyfreed Japan from its liquidity trap—no
matter how it was induced—would
depreciate the yen. Because exchange
rates tend to respond to monetary policy
changes faster than goods prices, a yen
depreciation would initially improve
Japan’s price competitiveness, thereby
boosting its exports and reducing its
imports. An accelerating inflation rate,
however, would eventually erode the
competitive gains from the deprecia-
tion, and import demand would rise
with the revival of GDP growth. 
Empirical studies are unclear about how
these offsetting influences play out over
time. Many suggest that a monetary
expansion could eventually worsen
Japan’s trade balance because renewed
growth would increase that country’s
imports more than enough to offset the
temporary gain in price competitiveness
resulting from the yen depreciation.
Claims that exchange-rate-based 
proposals violate international law may
be technically correct, but largely
overblown. The proposals are not likely
to do much damage to other countries. 
Some commentators have been espe-
cially concerned that a depreciation of
the yen will have dramatic effects in
East Asia. These commentators fear
that floating East Asian currencies,
especially the Singapore dollar, South
Korean won, and Taiwan dollar, will
depreciate in sympathy with the yen
and put excessive pressure on those
currencies maintaining a fixed parity
with the dollar, particularly China’s. 
These concerns also seem exaggerated.
Detailed trade data reveal that Chinese
exports compete most closely with
exports from Indonesia, Thailand, Tai-
wan, and Malaysia—countries whose
exchange rates do not move all that
closely with the yen. This finding sug-
gests that the competitive effects of yen
depreciation on China are likely to be
modest. Moreover, the share of China’s
exports destined for Japan has
increased rapidly, from 13.9 percent in
1995 to 20.8 percent in 2000. China
stands to gain enormously from a
Japanese economic revival, even one
entailing a weaker yen.
■ Global Liquidity Trap?
What works well for one can fail miser-
ably for many. Although the exchange-
rate-based proposals for escaping a 
liquidity trap rely on rather uncertain
transmission mechanisms, they are 
theoretically feasible. If it were willing 
to commit the resources, Japan probably
could escape a liquidity trap by follow-
ing the exchange-rate-based approaches.
But if the United States and the euro area
face liquidity traps and adopt similar
strategies, this route will be unavailable.
All three currencies cannot simultane-
ously depreciate against each other. 
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FIGURE 2 JAPANESE MONETARY BASE AND M2
SOURCE:  International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics.





Please send corrected mailing label to
the above address.
Material may be reprinted if the source is
credited. Please send copies of reprinted
material to the editor.
Owen F. Humpage is an economic advisor at
the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
William R. Melick is an associate professor of
economics at Kenyon College and a research
associate at the Bank. The authors thank Alain
Chaboud, Carolyn Evans, Dale Henderson,
Lars Svensson, Edward Stevens, and Edwin
Truman for comments on an early version of
this Commentary.
The views expressed here are those of the
authors and not necessarily those of the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Cleveland, the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, or
its staff. 
Economic Commentary is published by the
Research Department of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland. To receive copies or to be
placed on the mailing list, e-mail your request
to 4d.subscriptions@clev.frb.org or fax it to
216-579-3050. Economic Commentary is also
available at the Cleveland Fed’s site on the
World Wide Web: www.clev.frb.org/research,
where glossaries of terms are provided.
We invite comments, questions, and sugges-





For background on deflation and
liquidity traps:
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland,
2002 Annual Report. 
Paul R. Krugman, 1998, “It’s Baaack:
Japan’s Slump and the Return of the
Liquidity Trap,” Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity 2, pp. 137–203. 
On exchange-rate-based escapes
from liquidity traps: 
Bennett T. McCallum, 2000, “Theoreti-
cal Analysis Regarding a Zero Lower
Bound on Nominal Interest Rates,” 
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking,
vol. 32 (November, Part 2), pp. 870–904. 
Bennett T. McCallum, 2003, “Japanese
Monetary Policy, 1991-2001,” Federal
Reserve Bank of Richmond, Economic
Quarterly, vol. 89 (Winter), pp. 1–32. 
Lars E. O. Svensson, 2001, “The Zero
Bound in an Open Economy: A Fool-
proof Way of Escaping from a Liquidity
Trap,” Monetary and Economic Studies
(Special Edition) (February), 
pp. 277–321. 
For critical commentary on this and
other proposals:
Lawrence J. Christiano, 2000, “Com-
ment on Analysis Regarding a Zero
Lower Bound on Nominal Interest
Rates,” Journal of Money, Credit, and
Banking, vol. 32 (November, Part 2),
pp. 909–30. 
James Clouse et al., 2000, 
“Monetary Policy When the Nominal
Short-Term Interest Rate Is Zero,” Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, November 27. 